CAUSES OF FALL OF BASTIA 23

tfoore had during the Bastia period acted with extra->rdinary judgment, rectitude, and good sense. The evidence here supplied shows distinctly that in the •esult Bastia fell by the precise means which all along doore had predicted could alone under the later circumstances lead to its fall—viz., famine induced by he strictness of the blockade and the interception of 11 land supplies by the Corsicans. Every round fired >y the batteries, which were erected against Moore's udgment, was a round uselessly expended that would >e very much required afterwards.

The odd thing is that neither biographer seems o see that both Sir Gilbert and Nelson substantially onfirm this view as soon as they are able to investi-;ate the condition of the place. "This garrison (of Jastia) was very strong in numbers," writes Sir Gilbert. 'There remained at the surrender about 3500, all egular troops, and much finer men and better clothed nd more like soldiers than I like to see them. The lockade of the port was undoubtedly the chief means f reducing the place, which was in total want of food )hen it surrendered. I am glad there were not many f the inhabitants killed, nor is there much material amage to the town except at the end near our atteries."1 "I never yet told Lord Hood," wrote I"elson a year later, "that after everything was fixed 3r the attack of Bastia I had information given me of tie enormous number of troops we had to oppose us/'2 n other words, if Nelson was right as to the impression rhich his representations had made on the Admiral, lood throughout was acting on false information. The of the French officers combined with this evidence

1 "Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot," vol. ii. p. 25.

2 "Lifeof Nelson," vol. i. p. 124.